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INTRODUCTION 
 International development featured prominently in 2015 with the adoption of the Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development with a new set of Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement under 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
1
 Following this year of making 
commitments, 2016 is focused on implementation.
2
 As recognized by the United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme: 
“Today’s challenge is chiefly implementation. . . . [A] gap exists between stated commitments to 
sustainable development and the reality of implementing sustainable development policies and 
programmes in all countries and regions . . . .”3 This is similar to where the world was in 2000: 
“[D]espite significant progress in each conference . . . there was a sense of overload, over 
                                                          
1
 Officials Highlight AAAA, 2030 Agenda, Paris Agreement at 70th UNGA Anniversary, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (Jan. 11, 2016), available at http://sd.iisd.org/news/officials-highlight-aaaa-2030-agenda-
paris-agreement-at-70th-unga-anniversary/.  
2
 Nathalie Risse, Implementing the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs: Where to Start?, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (Feb. 4, 2016), available at http://sd.iisd.org/policy-updates/implementing-the-2030-
agenda-and-its-sdgs-where-to-start/.  
3
 UNDESA & UNDP, SYNTHESIS OF NATIONAL REPORTS FOR RIO+20, 2 (2012), available at 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/742RIO+20_Synthesis_Report_Final.pdf.  
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engagement and summit fatigue with too many recommendations on too many subjects . . . .”4 
Though sixteen years of trial and error separate where the world was in 2000 and where we are 
today, the international community continues to apply the same procedures while hoping for a 
different outcome.
5
  
 In 2000, the international community decided to implement the numerous commitments 
of the 1990’s (e.g. the 300-page Agenda 216) using the Millennium Development Goals 
(“MDGs”).7 The MDGs were a novel approach to implementation using the “SMART” goal 
format: Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time-bound.
8
 For example, the MDGs 
took a commitment to end poverty and created a goal of “[halving], between 1990 and 2015, the 
proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day.”9 In addition to this goal, the 
MDG framework also included indicators to measure progress towards achieving the goal: the 
proportion of the population below $1.25 (PPP) per day, the poverty gap ratio, and the share of 
poorest quintile in national consumption.
10
 Though the MDGs look great on paper, they were not 
successful.
11
 Despite this, the international community decided to replace the MDGs with a new 
set of goals, the Sustainable Development Goals (“SDGs”).12 
 Rather than repeating a process that has not worked in the past, the international 
community should try something new. One option for a new implementation model is the 
                                                          
4
 David Hulme, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (MDGS): A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S BIGGEST 
PROMISE, 11-12, available at http://hummedia.manchester.ac.uk/institutes/gdi/publications/workingpapers/bwpi/
bwpi-wp-10009.pdf (quoting Colin Bradford, Towards 2015: From Consensus Formation to Implementation of the 
MDGs - The Historical Background, 1990-2002 4 (unpublished mimeo, 2002)). 
5
 This being a common definition of insanity.  
6
 UN General Assembly, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc A/Conf.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
7
 See, e.g., Ryan Brenner, Global Goal-Setting: How the Current Development Goal Model Undermines 
International Development Law, 24 Mich. St. Int'l L. Rev. 145 (2015); Hulme, supra note 4. 
8
 See, Mark Murphy, ‘SMART’ Goals Can Sometimes Be Dumb, Forbes (Jan. 8, 2015), available at 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markmurphy/2015/01/08/smart-goals-can-sometimes-be-dumb/#6a1f58ce142c.  
9
 The Millennium Development Goals Indicators, http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=indicators/
officiallist.htm (last visited May 10, 2016). 
10
 Id.  
11
 See, infra, at 8. 
12
 UN General Assembly, The Future We Want, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/288, at ¶¶ 246-48 (Sept. 11, 2012). 
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implementation mechanism created by the Paris Agreement: the Individually Determined 
National Contribution (“INDC”).13 Under this model, States agree to an overarching, 
international goal (e.g. limiting the increase in global average temperature) and then create their 
own, State-specific implementation plan outlining how they, individually, will contribute to 
achieving that goal.
14
 Applying this model to international development, the international 
community already has a plethora of goals and legal obligations, so States could easily take these 
international objectives and draft their own implementation plans following similar procedures 
and requirements established by the INDCs.
15
 Though it is still too early to assess whether the 
climate change INDCs will be a success, it is better to try something new to implement 
international development than apply a process that has already proved to be a failure.  
 
I. OBLIGATION TO ENGAGE IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
In its simplest form, international development is about economic growth. A more 
holistic view aims at improving standards of living by addressing such issues as livelihoods, 
education, health care, and housing. However, “[d]evelopment is more than improvements in 
people’s well-being: it also describes the capacity of the system to provide the circumstances for 
that continued well-being.”16 More recently, sustainability has been incorporated into 
development such that the traditional objectives are now meant to be achieved without 
compromising environmental integrity.   
                                                          
13
 UNFCCC COP, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
14
 Id, at ¶13. 
15
 See, infra, at 24. 
16
 Owen Barder, What Is Development?, Center for Global Development (Aug. 16, 2012), available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-development.  
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 There are a number of reasons for a State to engage in development. Domestically, one of 
the reasons governments exist is to promote the public welfare.
17
 Thus, working to improve the 
lives of citizens at home is a logical endeavor. Spending locally collected taxes on improving the 
lives of people abroad, however, is not intuitively beneficial. However, meeting the basic needs 
of people abroad reduces instability and promotes a more secure and peaceful global 
community.
18
 Additionally, economic development abroad creates new markets for a State’s 
exports.
19
 Aside from these practical justifications, morality suggests that wealthy States should 
aid poorer States and justice may require reparations for past colonization and exploitation.
20
  
 International development not only plays a role in a State’s discretionary foreign policy, 
it is also codified throughout international law. The dominant obligation
21
 to facilitate 
development comes from Article 55 of the United Nations Charter:  
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations 
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote:  
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions 
of economic and social progress and development;  
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and 
related problems; and international cultural and educational 
cooperation; and  
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, 
sex, language, or religion.
22
 
 
                                                          
17
 “[T]he purpose of government as such, which is the public good and preservation of property.” John Locke, 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ¶239 (1689).  
18
 See OECD, Development Assistance Committee, SHAPING THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF 
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION, 6 (1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/2508761.pdf. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id. 
21
 “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall 
prevail.” UN Charter art. 103.  
22
 Id. at art. 55. 
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Article 56 builds upon this statement of purpose by requiring all Member States of the United 
Nations “to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the 
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.”23 What this essentially means is that 
Member States of the United Nations are required to take actions towards the achievement of 
international development.  
 To outline some of the requirements of Article 55, the United Nations drafted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Under the Declaration:  
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, 
and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.
24
 
 
The Declaration proclaims that this rights is a “common standard of achievement” and that 
“every individual and every organ of society . . . shall strive . . . to promote respect for these 
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their 
universal and effective recognition and observance.”25  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights further describes 
the requirements of Article 55 by taking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a General 
Assembly resolution, and establishing a legally binding treaty with more specific obligations. 
The Covenant reiterates the requirements of the Declaration by stating: “The States Parties to the 
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself 
and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
                                                          
23
 Id. at art. 56. 
24
 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
25
 Id. at prmbl. 
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improvement of living conditions”,26 but also expands the coverage to a number of other 
economic, social, and cultural rights. The Covenant then goes a step further by obligating States 
Parties “to take steps . . . , to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by 
all appropriate means . . . .”27 
 More recently, General Assembly conferences and summits have reaffirmed the 
obligation to engage in international development. The outcome document of the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (known as the Rio Declaration) provides: 
“All States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an 
indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in 
standards of living and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world.”28 
Agenda 21, another agreement from the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, contains over 300 pages of objectives, activities, and means of implementation to 
further sustainable development.
29
 The Millennium Declaration, which is the outcome document 
of the 2000 Millennium Summit and one of the bases for the MDGs, states:  
We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and 
children from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme 
poverty, to which more than a billion of them are currently 
subjected. We are committed to making the right to development a 
reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human race from 
want. 
 
We resolve therefore to create an environment – at the national and 
global levels alike – which is conducive to development and to the 
elimination of poverty.
30
 
                                                          
26
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 
6 I.L.M. 360 (1967), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
27
 Id. at art. 2. 
28
 UN General Assembly, Rio Declaration, Principal 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I) (June 13, 1992). 
29
 Agenda 21, supra note 6. 
30
 UN General Assembly, Millennium Declaration, ¶¶ 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).  
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The outcome document of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (known as the 
Johannesburg Declaration) provides: “We commit ourselves to act together, united by a common 
determination to save our planet, promote human development and achieve universal prosperity 
and peace.”31 And most recently, the outcome of the 2012 United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (known as “The Future We Want”) states:  
We also reaffirm the need to achieve sustainable development by: 
promoting sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth, 
creating greater opportunities for all, reducing inequalities, raising 
basic standards of living; fostering equitable social development 
and inclusion; and promoting integrated and sustainable 
management of natural resources and ecosystems that supports 
inter alia economic, social and human development while 
facilitating ecosystem conservation, regeneration and restoration 
and resilience in the face of new and emerging challenges.
32
 
 
 Calls for international development also show up in much less expected fora. For 
example, the preamble to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade notes that “the field of 
trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective 
demand, developing the full use of the resources of the world and expanding the production and 
exchange of goods . . . .”33 The Agreement further calls on States Parties to “collaborate in 
analysing the development plans and policies of individual less-developed contracting parties 
and in examining trade and aid relationships . . . .”34 In fact, two of the listed purposes of the 
International Financial Institutions created at Bretton Woods are:  
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of 
members by facilitating the investment of capital for productive 
purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or 
                                                          
31
 UN General Assembly, Johannesburg Declaration, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20 (Sept. 4, 2002).  
32
 The Future We Want, supra note 12, at ¶ 4. 
33
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), pmbl., 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.  
34
 Id. at XXXVIII (2)(c). 
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disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to 
peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of 
productive facilities and resources in less developed countries. . . .  
 
(iii) To promote the long-range balanced growth of international 
trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments 
by encouraging international investment for the development of the 
productive resources of members, thereby assisting in raising 
productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their 
territories.
35
 
 
This all goes to show that, throughout the international legal system, there are numerous 
ambitions, commitments, and legal obligations to promote the objectives of international 
development. 
 
II. THE FAILURE OF THE MDGS  
With so many international commitments and re-affirmations, it is a wonder that there are 
still people living in abject poverty. However, words on paper do not automatically translate to 
results on the ground: effective implementation is needed to effectuate the aspirations of 
international development. The MDGs were created as an attempt to do just that, but failed to 
make much change.  
Looking first at the goals themselves, many of the targets were missed in many parts of 
the world.
36
 While the goals did increase levels of development aid, it “is more difficult to 
calculate the impact of the Millennium Development Goals on actual development outcomes.”37 
Comparing the progress made from 2000-2015 to historical trends, “in no case is there an 
                                                          
35
 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22,1944 Final Act 
and Related Documents, art. 1, Department of State publication 2187, Conference Series 55; also, Department of 
State publication 2511, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1502. 
36
 See UN, THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 2015 (July 2015), available at http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20(July%201).pdf.  
37
 Charles Kenny, MDGs to SDGs: Have we Lost the Plot?, Center for Global Development (May 27, 2015), 
available at http://www.cgdev.org/publication/mdgs-sdgs-have-we-lost-plot.   
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obvious sign of a significant trend-break towards faster progress since 2000.” This would suggest 
that, at best, the MDGs helped maintain the status quo while, at worst, the MDGs did absolutely 
nothing or even stalled potential accelerations.  
Even the few examples of a “somewhat faster” rate compared to historical averages, such 
as the increase in global income levels, break down when the data is disaggregated by region.
38
 
Digging even deeper into the apparent successes shows that external variables, like the economic 
growth of the BRICS (accomplished by implementing policies outside the scope of the MDGs), 
account for much of the increase.
39
 As noted by one scholar: “[T]he world me[eeting] the first 
goal – halving extreme poverty – in 2010, five years ahead of the MDGs’ deadline, was mainly 
the doing of two countries that barely paid attention to them.”40 Moreover, the rates for some 
indicators, such as reductions in maternal mortality rates, actually slowed during 2000-2015 
when compared to historical rates.
41
 
 Next, the “SMART” structure of the goals adds an additional layer impracticality. One 
study concluded that the major flaws with the MDGs were that development priorities are too 
complex for the simplification forced by the MDGs, SMART goals inherently leave out non-
measurable objectives, and the focus on tangible outcomes ignores many important aspects of 
development (such as capacity building).
42
 Another scholar added that “[q]uantitative targets also 
ignored quality considerations: as Malawi’s former president Joyce Banda said: ‘We are all 
                                                          
38
 Id.  
39
 See Matthew Lockwood, What Have the MDGs Achieved? We Don’t Really Know…Heretical Thoughts from 
Matthew Lockwood, OXFAM Blogs (Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/what-if-we-applied-
the-results-agenda-to-the-mdgs-quasiheretical-guest-post-from-matthew-lockwood/. 
40
 Alan Beattie, The New UN Development Goals, Still Missing the Point, Financial Times Beyond BRICS (Aug. 21, 
2014), available at http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2014/08/21/the-new-un-development-goals-still-missing-the-
point/.   
41
 Lockwood, supra note 39. 
42
 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Alicia Ely Yamin, & Joshua Greenstein, The Power of Numbers: A Critical Review of 
Millennium Development Goal Targets for Human Development and Human Rights, 15 J. OF HUM. DEV. & 
CAPABILITIES, 105, 113 (Apr. 2015). 
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racing towards achieving education for all by 2015. But did we have classrooms in Malawi? Did 
we have desks? Did we have teachers? The MDG demands that we get as many children as 
possible into school – but what about quality?’”43  
Additionally, “target-setting can also unintentionally distort priorities by displacing 
attention from other objectives, disrupting ongoing initiatives and alliances, creating perverse 
incentives, and undermining alternative policy analyses.”44 When selected properly, this may not 
be as problematic. However, the MDG drafting process was essentially an arbitrary cherry-
picking session that selected only eight objectives from the hundreds created during the 1990s 
and significantly modified these objectives to be much less ambitious.
45
 Thus, these arbitrarily 
decided targets deviated from established legal requirements and then displaced attention from 
the legal requirements and the existing programs in place attempting to implement them.
46
  
The structure of the MDGs also created a number of perverse incentives. For example, 
Target 7D calls on States to “achieve[] a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers.”47 To achieve this goal, one developing State cleared-out its slums 
claiming that eliminating slums was an improvement.
48
 Thus, the literal letter of the goal is 
followed without actually doing what is best from a development and human rights perspective. 
Likewise, the format of a goal-set suggests that the best course of action is to achieve as many 
goals as possible. Whether a State is a donor promoting international development abroad or is 
implementing the goals at home:  
“[C]hecking off” one really hard target ends up looking just the 
same as “checking off” one really easy target[;] “checking off” two 
                                                          
43
 Beattie, supra note 40.  
44
 Fukuda-Parr, supra note 39, at 106. 
45
 Id. at 112. 
46
 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 7. 
47
 The Millennium Development Goals Indicators, supra note 9. 
48
 Malcolm Langford, A Poverty of Rights: Six Ways to Fix the MDGs, 41 INST. DEV. STUD. BULL. 83, 86 (2010). 
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targets looks better even than “checking off” one, even if the one 
target was much harder to achieve and lead to a more significant 
impact. Thus, the incentive is to focus on the areas (either 
substantive or geographic) that are just below the target. This is 
because it will take less effort to push the indicator into 
compliance, yet the same political gain of meeting a target is 
achieved. This incentive to focus on the “close” areas is coupled 
with a disincentive to focus on the really “far” areas: success is 
only measured by achieving a goal, so getting “really close” is a 
failure. . . . This set of incentives funnels support away from the 
areas that need it most.
49
   
 
Altogether, these incentives take away from the overall purpose of international development 
and create a rat race to achieve arbitrary objectives by an arbitrary deadline.  
 These problems have led one scholar to claim that the MDGs are inherently unfair to 
Africa. William Easterly took issue with the numerous statements made during 2000-2015 noting 
that “Africa . . . is the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals”, so he analyzed the 
MDGs from a Sub-Saharan African context.
50
 The review found that the MDGs made Africa 
look worse than other regions because the goals focused on absolute changes, were “change 
targets” instead of “level targets”, and focused on positive rather than negative indicators.51 For 
example, the poverty target calls on States
52
 to “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of 
people whose income is less than one dollar a day.”53 However, in 2000 States in Latin America 
had poverty rates of 5-10% while States in Africa had poverty rates of 35-50%: to meet the goal, 
Latin American States only had to address 2.5-5% of their populations while African States had 
to address 17.5-25% of their populations.
54
 This format is even more skewed due to Africa’s 
                                                          
49
 Brenner, supra note 7 at 27 (citing Langford, supra note 48).  
50
 William Easterly, How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa, 37 WORLD DEV. 26, 26 (2009).  
51
 Id. at 27. 
52
 The MDGs actually do not specifically call on States to meet the objectives themselves. A goal to “halve, between 
1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day” could refer to a halving of the 
entire world population collectively, or it could refer to a State halving their own population. The international 
community took the latter approach when reviewing progress.    
53
 The Millennium Development Goals Indicators, supra note 9. 
54
 Easterly, supra note 50, at 28. 
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higher population densities and growth rates.
55
 In attempting to decrease poverty, Africa’s 
economy grew by approximately 5% each year; higher than any other region’s average growth in 
history, yet short of the 7% necessary to meet the goal.
56
 Despite what would otherwise be 
classified as a monumental success, Africa was deemed a failure.  
 Problems also exist with the goals structured as absolutes. For example, Goal 2 is 
“achieve universal primary education.”57 States that had universal or near universal primary 
education in 2000 had basically already achieved the goal before it was even set whereas States 
in Africa with much lower enrollment had much more work to do to avoid being “a failure”.58 
Though many States in Africa did end up “failing”, the rate of primary enrollment in Africa far 
exceeded that of Western States when they were developing.
59
 Easterly concludes by noting the 
demoralizing aspect of being labeled a failure and suggests that the MDGs make Africa appear 
more negative than is justified given its tremendous progress.
60
 The wider problem with this 
determination is that “it might have real consequences for things like private foreign investment 
to reinforce the stereotype that ‘Africa always fails.’”61 
 Looking at the experience of a State in Africa confirms that this bias was felt on the 
ground. Scholar Mwangi Waituru worked extensively with the Kenyan government and reported 
on the view of the MDGs “as an external requirement guiding access to international aid, rather 
than a shared commitment to core development priorities.”62 This is due to the top-down aspect 
of the agenda which meets the interests of donors yet is “far removed from the possible business 
                                                          
55
 Id.  
56
 Id. at 29. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id.  
60
 Id. at 33. 
61
 Id.  
62
 Mwangi Waituru, Lessons from the Implementation of MDGs in Kenya: Options for a Post-2015 Framework, 44 
IDS Bul. 30, 30 (Sept. 2013). 
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of Government”.63 As a developing State working with many other programs and legal 
obligations, Kenya is particularly aware of the “lack of coherence between the MDGs and other 
instruments for development planning.”64 In fact, “[a] recent consultative meeting on post-2015 
saw one senior government officer asking why the government should pursue distractive global 
frameworks when it had a national development agenda to pursue. Some complained that the 
donors had not produced funds to support ‘their’ MDGs, whilst others argued that Kenya had 
spent too much on reporting, monitoring and evaluation that had been required elsewhere.”65 
 These findings all suggest that the MDGs were poorly drafted, poorly received, and 
poorly implemented. Though the world is certainly a better place now than in 2000 for a number 
of indicators, the MDGs did very little to help. A study of the MDGs and goal-setting in general 
found that “indicators exert influence in two ways: by setting performance standards against 
which progress can be monitored, rewarded or penalized; and by creating a ‘knowledge effect’ 
where the indicators intended to reflect a concept effectively redefine it.”66 Given the much 
broader and more ambitious field of development objectives, the most negative effect of the 
MDGs is likely their redefining of development as eight simple goals. Failing to meet ambitious 
goals while still making the world a better place is still admirable, but distracting efforts from 
greater initiatives while still failing to accomplish the goals is a setback for development. 
 
III. REPLACING THE MDGS WITH THE SDGS 
A. MANDATING THE SWITCH 
                                                          
63
 Id. at 31. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Fukuda-Parr, supra note 39, at 106. 
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The MDGs were essentially a product of chance, developed mostly outside of the United 
Nations system, that took a product of the OECD States and applied it to all of development.
67
 
The drafting process focused solely on a fifteen year period (all of the MDGs have a 2015 target 
date) without considering a long-term strategy. This lack of foresight was largely due to the 
scrambling and disconnected negotiations needed to establish the MDGs in the first place; there 
simply was not enough time to create a bigger, more well-thought-out plan. The consequence of 
this process, though, was a large degree of uncertainty regarding the requirements post-2015. For 
example, the goal of halving the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 2015 was 
just that: a standalone goal to halve the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 
2015. It is not clear whether the drafters assumed meeting the MDGs would be sufficient to 
satisfy existing legal obligations or whether the MDGs were meant to be the first goal-set in a 
series of goal-sets striving for even more ambitious objectives (e.g. zero people living on less 
than a dollar a day). As the year 2015 approached, the United Nations had to answer for these 
uncertainties.  
To start preparing for the post-2015 period, the High-level Plenary Meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly on the progress towards the Millennium Development Goals, which 
met in 2010, requested the Secretary-General to study issues of development beyond 2015 and 
make recommendations to the General Assembly.
68
 In responding to this request, the Secretary 
General wrote the following in his 2011 Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium 
Development Goals report: 
Sustainable development goals need to remain at the centre. Not all 
Millennium Development Goals are expected to be achieved by 
2015, but even if they were, much further progress would be 
needed to achieve higher levels of sustainable development beyond 
                                                          
67
 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 7; Hulme, supra note 4.  
68
 UN General Assembly, G.A. Res. 65/1, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/1 (Sept. 22, 2010). 
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2015 (to eradicate, rather than halve, poverty, for example, as 
called for in the Millennium Development Goals agenda). 
Discussions could focus on whether and in what sense goals need 
to be broadened or accelerated (e.g., more focus on quality and 
absolute numbers rather than percentages; also focus on the issues 
raised below), and whether to change the system to monitor 
progress and delivery on commitments.
69
 
 
A year later at the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, in 2012, the General 
Assembly took these recommendations, “recognize[d] the importance and utility of a set of 
sustainable development goals”, and “resolve[d] to establish an inclusive and transparent 
intergovernmental process . . . with a view to developing global sustainable development goals to 
be agreed by the General Assembly.”70 Thus, the SDGs were conceived.  
 
 
 
B. THE DRAFTING PROCESS 
 Whereas the MDG drafting process was mostly exclusive, secretive, and unplanned, the 
SDG drafting process “has been marked by an orgy of consultation and debate.”71 Moreover, 
while “the MDGs were essentially about focusing aid on the poorest and most disadvantaged in a 
few narrow areas, [the SDGs are] about everyone on the planet[;] a holistic vision of human 
flourishing that is inclusive of the myriad concerns of sustainability.”72 These changes of 
increased inclusivity, openness, and planning led to a fairly complex drafting process.    
                                                          
69
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 In addition to the report mentioned above recommending SDGs to the General Assembly, 
the Secretary-General responded to the High-level Plenary Meeting’s request by appointing a 
Special Advisor on Post-2015 Development Planning
73
 and creating an “an informal senior 
coordination group” made up of the Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development in 
the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General 
for Development Policy for the United Nations Development Programme, the Assistant 
Secretary-General for Policy and Programme at United Nations Women, and the new Special 
Advisor on Post-2015 Development Planning.
74
 These institutions within the United Nations 
Secretariat began developing the Post-2015 Development Agenda as, at the time of their 
creation, the SDGs were not yet mandated.  
In January of 2012 (still before the SDGs were mandated), the Secretary-General brought 
together a group of over 60 United Nations agencies to form the United Nations System Task 
Team on the Post-2015 Development Agenda.
75
 The Task Team served as a forum for 
collaboration and led to the creation of a number of technical reports.
76
 In June of 2012, the Task 
Team produced a report, Realizing the Future We Want for All, recommending strategies for the 
Post-2015 Development Agenda.
77
 Like the Secretary-General’s report produced a year earlier, 
the report endorsed the development goal approach but stressed that “[t]he purpose of a global 
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development agenda is thus not to prescribe specific development strategies or policies, but to 
provide guidance for priority setting at all levels (global, regional, national and sub-national).”78 
In February of 2012, the Secretary-General also hosted an Experts Group Meeting to 
extend the collaboration beyond the United Nations.
79
 Experts from forty-five organizations 
within the United Nations and from nineteen organization outside the United Nations met to 
discuss development post-2015.
80
 The expert input from academia was implemented on a more 
permanent basis in August of 2012 with the creation of the Sustainable Development Solutions 
Network out of Columbia University.
81
 
 After the General Assembly decided to replace the MDGs with the SDGs at the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in June of 2012, the Secretary-General created 
the High-level Panel of Eminent Person on the Post-2015 Development Agenda in July of 
2012.
82
 Co-chaired by the presidents of Indonesia and Liberia and the Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom, the High-level Panel brought together government, civil society, business, and 
academia to travel the world and assess the best ways to implement development in the post-
2015 period.
83
 In March of 2013 the High-level Panel published a report, A New Global 
Partnership: Eradicate Poverty and Transform Economies Through Sustainable Development, 
that listed the first set of goals to consider for the SDGs.
84
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 In addition to mandating the SDGs at the Conference on Sustainable Development in 
June of 2012, the General Assembly also created the Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals to actually draft the goal-set.
85
 The formal procedures and program of work 
for the Open Working Group was passed by the General Assembly in January of 2013.
86
 The 
Open Working Group then met thirteen times from March 2013 to July 2014.
87
 Within each 
session, a deliberative group of thirty seats was informed about development topics and drafted a 
goal.
88
 Each of the thirty seats was represented by one to four United Nations Member States (set 
by the resolution) with each group of States determining how the seat would act within the Open 
Working Group (e.g. which States would be present, which State would speak, how the seat 
would vote, etc.).
89
    
 Once the Open Working Group began meeting, the focus of the other entities in the Post-
2015 Development Agenda shifted towards the drafting process by providing reports and hosting 
side events in an effort to exert some influence. For example, the United Nations System Task 
Team established a subgroup called the inter-agency technical support team to support the Open 
Working Group to serve as a liaison between the Task Team and the Open Working Group by 
providing technical support, analytical service, expert panelists, and background material based 
on the work of the Task Team.
90
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 Adding to the “orgy of consultation and debate” the United Nations Development Group 
(a group of “UN funds, programmes, specialized agencies, departments, and offices that play a 
role in development”91) conducted national consultations in over sixty countries and global 
consultation based on eleven different themes.
92
 Similarly, the United Nations Regional 
Economic Commissions hosted a series of discussions within their respective regions.
93
 In 
addition to State representation, the United Nations also engaged with the business community 
through the Global Compact
94
 and with average citizens through a survey on the website “My 
World” where people could prioritize development issues.95 
 To take-stock of these processes, as well as the non-SDG development processes such as 
the Financing for Development meetings, High Level Political Forum, and General Assembly 
debates and high level events, the Secretary-General issued another report in July of 2013 called: 
A Life of Dignity for All: Accelerating Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 
and Advancing the United Nations Development Agenda Beyond 2015.
96
 Within this report, the 
Secretary-General noted that “[t]he many consultations and reports suggest that a single, 
balanced and comprehensive set of goals, universal to all nations, which aims to eradicate all 
forms of poverty and integrate sustainable development in all its dimensions, should form the 
core of the agenda.”97  
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The Open Working Group’s final meeting was held in July of 2014.98 A preliminary list 
of SDGs was then adopted by the Open Working Group and presented to the General 
Assembly.
99
 The General Assembly accepted the preliminary list and initiated an 
intergovernmental negotiation process to formalize the goal-set.
100
 To kick this process off, the 
Secretary-General issued a synthesis report in December of 2014, The Road to Dignity by 2030: 
Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the Planet, outlining all of the processes 
conducted.
101
 Member States then met every month from January to July in 2015 debating, 
negotiating, and refining the SDGs.
102
 Additionally, the General Assembly hosted several high-
level debates and an informal hearing with civil society.
103
 Finally, in September of 2015, the 
United Nations hosted a special summit
104
 where the official SDG list was adopted.
105
 The list 
was then ratified by the General Assembly in October.
106
 
 
 
C. EVALUATION OF THE NEW GOALS 
 While the United Nations should be commended for improving the inclusivity and 
transparency of the drafting processes, there are still a few issues. Following the Secretary-
General’s recommendation, the Member States implemented “a single, balanced and 
                                                          
98
 Interactive Timeline, Sustainable Development 2015, supra note 81. 
99
 UN General Assembly, Report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable Development 
Goals, U.N. Doc. A/68/970 (Aug. 12, 2014). 
100
 UN General Assembly, Res. 68/309, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/309 (Sept. 12, 2014). 
101
 UN Secretary General, The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming All Lives and Protecting the 
Planet, U.N. Doc A/69/700 (Dec. 4, 2014).  
102
 Interactive Timeline, Sustainable Development 2015, supra note 81. 
103
 Id. 
104
 United Nations Sustainable Development Summit 2015, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/summit (last visited May 10, 2016).  
105
 UN General Assembly, Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/Res/70/1 (Oct. 21, 2015).   
106
 Id.  
Page 21 of 33 
 
comprehensive set of goals, universal to all nations”.107 What this means, though, is that the 
United States, Denmark, and Japan have the same set of goals as Syria, Haiti, and South Sudan: 
either some goals are under-ambitious for the most development States or the least developed 
States have no hope of achieving the full set. Moreover, though the SDGs are fairly holistic, they 
are still a prioritization. Prioritization is inherently about ensuring that the most important tasks 
are completed first, which is problematic when each State has different areas of development 
they need to prioritize. Even with the most participatory and informed process, it is impossible to 
take into account every local situation and form a universal goal-set equally applicable to all.  
 Moreover, various examinations of the MDGs have suggested that this is not the best way 
to go forward. From the Kenyan case study discussed above, the author came to the conclusion 
that “[i]f the results of the new development agenda are to achieve transformative change for the 
majority of Kenyans, it is important that the MDG/SDG frameworks are grounded in human 
rights and reinforce existing state commitments to international human rights commitments.”108 
Though the existing frameworks were consulted, the drafting process of the SDGs did not ensure 
that international legal objectives were effectively incorporated. Thus, many of the same 
problems of the MDGs will be perpetuated during this 2015-2030 period. The Kenyan case study 
similarly concludes: “There is a risk that MDG/SDG frameworks will fall short of the standards 
and goals already framed in international treaties, thus providing a convenient distraction, and a 
basis on which states can fall short of the human rights standards already agreed.”109 
 The specific SDG targets, themselves, have also been extensively criticized. The most 
common criticisms include the sheer number of goals (169 targets compared to 18 for the 
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MDGs) and the impracticality of attaining them.
110
 As noted by one scholar “[t]he targets are a 
mixture of the arbitrarily precise – ‘sustain per capita economic growth…in particular at least 7 
per cent per annum GDP growth in the least-developed countries’ – and the comfortingly vague 
– ‘by 2030 achieve sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources.’”111 Similarly, 
the targets do not even follow the UN’s own estimates.112 For example, Target 3.1 calls for less 
than 70 maternal deaths per 100,000 when the current ratio is about 210 per 100,000: a reduction 
that the World Health Organization does not believe is feasible.
113
 Such impossibility is 
extensive throughout the goal-set:  
According to the Open Working Group, in just sixteen years’ time 
we will have been able to end poverty in all its forms everywhere; 
achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all; 
end hunger and malnutrition; attained universal health coverage; 
wipe out AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical 
diseases; provide universal secondary education and universal 
access to tertiary education; end gender discrimination and 
eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls; ensure 
adequate and affordable housing, water, sanitation, reliable modern 
energy, and communications technology access for all; and 
(strangely) both prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution 
of all kinds alongside preventing species loss. If that’s not enough, 
we will have also eliminated all discriminatory laws, policies, and 
practices.
114
  
 
If the point of implementation is to make international development work on the ground, the 
goals should at least be feasible. Beyond that, though, the international community should learn 
from its experiences and improve upon the MDGs. As the SDGs are functionally an expanded 
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version of the MDGs, there has been no significant improvements in the implementation plan 
meaning the results of the SDGs will be similar to the failures of the MDGs.  
 
IV. CREATING THE INDCS UNDER THE UNFCCC 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) was 
adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development.
115
 As a 
framework convention, the UNFCCC basically just establishes principles and goals and then 
leaves the specifics of implementation for future protocol negotiations.
116
 The overall purpose of 
the UNFCCC is to “achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere 
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”117 
Since its adoption, the States Parties have been negotiating various ways to achieve this purpose.  
 To facilitate these negotiations, States Parties meet annually at a Conference of the 
Parties (“COP”).118 At the 1997 COP held in Kyoto, the States Parties adopted the first protocol 
to implement the UNFCCC: the Kyoto Protocol.
119
 Under the Kyoto Protocol, the industrialized 
States (listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC) were required to reduce greenhouse gas emission by 
an average of five percent below 1990 levels by 2012.
120
 The Annex I States could achieve this 
reduction through an emissions trading scheme (i.e. cap and trade), the clean development 
mechanism (i.e. finance sustainable development in developing States), or through joint 
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implementation (i.e. employ something similar to EPA’s bubble concept  to combine emissions 
of multiple States).
121
 Non-industrialized States were not required to do anything and could 
actually increase emissions as they developed.
122
 Due to concerns over the perceived inequity of 
the common but differentiated responsibility scheme, the Kyoto Protocol failed to gain the 
support of the world’s top emitters and has therefore failed to facilitate significant emission 
reductions
123
Responding to this failure, the States Parties at the 2007 COP in Bali decided to 
replace the Kyoto Protocol with some other tool to include more States and established a two 
year deadline on those negotiations.
124
 Two years later at the 2009 COP in Copenhagen, 
however, the Parties failed to reach an agreement.
125
 In 2011 at the COP in Durban, after 
creating a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol with a new deadline of 2020, the 
Parties tried again by creating a working group “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument 
or an agreed outcome with legal force” to be implemented after the second commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol ended in 2020.
126
 This working group then created an entirely new 
mechanism, the INDCs, and invited States to prepare an INDC for the 2013 COP in Warsaw 
based on what they were willing to contribute.
127
 At the following year’s COP in Lima, the 
Parties formalized the INDC process by listing what must and what should be included in an 
INDC.
128
 Specifically, States needed to list the scope of their plan, the timescale of 
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implementation, and their proposed methods.
129
 Additionally, they needed to state how the 
overall plan contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the UNFCCC.
130
 Developing 
States could list their needs, financial and capacity-based, and provide conditional goals based on 
the amount of funding they receive.
131
 The INDCs were then officially adopted as the next tool 
to implement the UNFCCC at the most recent COP in Paris in 2015.
132
 
 Under this new agreement, States are required to send to the Secretariat “their intended 
nationally determined contributions towards achieving the objective of the [UNFCCC] as set out 
in its Article 2” (“achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at 
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”).133 
The Secretariat is then to make all of the INDCs publicly available.
134
 States are to update their 
INDCs every five years
135
 with each successive contributions representing a progression beyond 
the previous one.
136
 During implementation, States are to track their progress and report 
biennially “including good practices, priorities, needs and gaps”.137 Additionally, periodic 
technical expert reviews of the INDCs and implementation will “identify areas of 
improvement”.138 
In other words, States are creating, committing to, and publicizing plans for what they, 
individually, are going to do to achieve the objectives of the UNFCCC. Each individual State’s 
goal-set then combines with all of the other goal-sets to achieve the international goal of 
stabilizing the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere. Plans are progressively updated 
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by the States and are subject to international review. States must also keep the international 
community informed as to how they are performing.  
This new “bottom-up” strategy allows for more flexibility than a traditional “top-down” 
model, it includes considerations of a State’s internal circumstances, and it respects State 
sovereignty.
139
 In fact, this tool has already gained support from the US (which is not a party to 
the Kyoto Protocol) and China (which is not required to do anything under the Kyoto Protocol) 
with both States submitting an INDC.
140
 As for the ambition of the INDCs, many of the current 
submissions actually do implement most, if not all, of the factors considered by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and some even add extra considerations.
141
 
However, when added together, the current INDCs fail to meet the international goal of keeping 
global temperature increase below 2 degrees Celsius, the indicator States have agreed to as 
“achieve[ing] . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”142 Thus, while 
States are cooperating with the INDC process and following the procedural requirements, the 
INDCs, themselves, are not currently ambitious enough to achieve the treaty’s objectives.  
 
V. REPLACING THE SDGS WITH INDCS 
A. THE NEED FOR SOMETHING NEW 
The field of international development already has overarching objectives and principles 
in place serving as a high-level ambition to improve the world. These goals and ideas are then 
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backed by decades of legal obligations and commitments to implement these ambitions and 
make them reality. What is missing is a realistic, feasible plan to take the ideas from the 
chambers of the United Nations and actually achieve them on the ground.  
 Now, this is no easy task and there is no magic bullet that will provide a simple solution. 
Moreover, political will and resource availability have the potential to thwart even the most well 
thought-out plan. However, the MDGs, despite being ambitious and well-intentioned, are not the 
best option. As discussed above, the idea of creating a set of prioritized goals that are 
meaningful, achievable, and tailored to what actually matters is functionally impossible when 
States are at different stages of development and localities are facing a variety of very different 
issues to a varying degree of severity. When such a prioritization was attempted through the 
creation of the MDGs, inequitable results occurred where, for example, sub-Saharan African 
States had much more work to do than the OECD States to achieve the MDG targets. This 
inequity not only paints much of Africa as a development failure, it also suggests that OECD 
States do not need improvement. Both of these implications are incorrect as shown by the 
amazing amount of progress made in States across Africa and by the unacceptable levels of 
inequality and greenhouse gas emission occurring in the “developed” world.  
Since the MDGs were not successful, or even a good model in the first place, the 
international community should look for a different tool to implement international development 
priorities rather than replace the MDGs with yet another goal-set. One management study found 
that goals can “cause systematic problems in organizations due to narrowed focus, increased risk 
taking, unethical behavior, inhibited learning, decreased cooperation, and decreased intrinsic 
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motivation.”143 Though the study is not completely dismissive of goal-setting, it notes that goals 
that are too specific can blind people and narrow their focus, goals that are too challenging can 
harm motivation and productivity, externally created goals are less likely to be followed, goals 
that are too focused on the short-term may harm long-term productivity, systemic failure to meet 
goals may cause harmful and unproductive behavior in an attempt to meet the goal at any cost, 
and individualized goals may cutoff cooperation as people focus on achieving their own 
objectives rather than helping the organization as a whole succeed.
144
 Many of these “negative 
side effects” featured prominently during the MDG period.  
Productive work management, on the other hand, specifies what needs to be done, 
determines how performance will be measured, and establishes a timescale.
145
 If goals are 
involved, they should include employee participation and take into account the knowledge of 
those actually doing the tasks, be ranked and evaluated by difficulty and priority, cascade from 
company-level goals to individualized goals, and make appropriate connections so that 
cooperation is promoted and conflict is avoided.
146
 Additionally, borrowing from the field of 
resource conservation, adaptive management suggests that successful projects are continuously 
reevaluated and revised throughout their implementation.
147
  
   
B. INDIVIDUALIZATION  
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Based on these best management practices, the best option for implementation of 
development objectives would be one that is individually derived; based on local circumstances, 
abilities, and needs; and is continuously evaluated and revised. This model actually matches the 
implementation contemplated by many international agreements. For example, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires States to “take steps . . . , to the 
maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization” of the Covenant’s goals.148 This means that States are not required to end poverty 
immediately, but instead take steps towards the progressive realization of that goal. Likewise, the 
Covenant requires States to take these steps to the maximum of their available resources. This 
implies that a State like the United States and a State like Haiti should be doing very different 
things. The MDGs did not follow this model as they imposed some middle ground goal where 
the wealthiest States could easily achieve the targets and the poorest States were almost 
inevitably going to fail. 
 Moving forward, the INDCs can serve as a model to improve implementation of 
development objectives. Within the field of climate change law, there is the overall objective 
established by the UNFCCC to “achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system.”149 Agreements made under this framework defined this objective as “[h]olding the 
increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to 
pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels”.150 Then, 
instead of implementing a top-down approach like the Kyoto Protocol or the MDG/SDGs to 
reach this objective, the Paris Agreement allows States to put forth individually-created INDCs.  
                                                          
148
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 26, at art. 2. 
149
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 117, art. 2. 
150
 Paris Agreement, supra note 13, at art. 2. 
Page 30 of 33 
 
Implementing such a plan in the development context could start with a broad 
requirement like the right to an adequate standard of living, which is already codified in 
numerous sources of international law. Then, the international community could set an 
acceptable criteria for what achieving that objective looks like. Once that is established, States 
would locally develop plans of action outlining the steps they will take to contribute to or meet 
an international objective. The international community could also set requirements for what 
these plans need to include, review each plan and make comments and recommendations, and 
require each State to report on progress towards implementation; the Paris agreement requires all 
of this for the INDCs.
151
 Moreover, unlike the uncertainty of transitioning from the MDGs to the 
SDGs and from the SDGs to an unknown post-2030 development agenda, this process could 
require plans be reevaluated and progressively updated every five years, just like the INDCs.  
What this would do is allow for an individualized goal-set based on the capacity and 
needs of the locality. It would also require an actual commitment, since the State is required to 
actively draft the plan itself rather than just passively sign on to an agreement. Once 
implemented, the technical advice given to the State would be based on the specific needs of the 
State and not on the steps required to meet some arbitrary internationally-derived objective: 
instead of figuring out how to cut poverty in half as required by the MDGs, a State could learn 
how to reduce as much poverty as it is capable of in the most efficient manner possible. Follow-
up goal-sets would also take into account what worked and what did not work and move forward 
accordingly whereas, under the current model, even the States that failed to meet the MDGs now 
have more ambitious targets in the SDGs.  
 This model is not perfect. Almost certainly there will be some INDCs that are under 
ambitious or do not include critical aspects that would be included in a set of internationally-
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derived development goals. However, ambitious goals that are unachievable are not useful, and 
States are going to do what they want regardless of what is included in a non-binding goal-set: if 
a State would leave a topic out of its INDC, it will probably ignore that topic in an international 
goal-set as well. Moreover, implementation should be about putting in place what has already 
been agreed. The INDC model would not replace the role of treaties or resolutions, so those 
instruments would continue to set the bar high and bind states to legal obligations. The INDCs 
would simply attempt to make previous agreements a reality and help States achieve their legal 
obligations. As such, implementation should not be the forum for dealing with States that do not 
follow through with their legal obligations and public commitments.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The call for reform and a localization of development is not new. The scholar studying 
MDG implementation in Kenya concluded that “[t]he strongest message from communities is a 
deep desire for the power to make decisions on issues that affect their lives; for access to equal 
opportunities; and for an enabling environment to sustain livelihoods.”152 Likewise, realization 
that the SMART model may not be appropriate has also been acknowledged. A comprehensive 
study of the MDGs concluded that “the essence of the MDGs is that they frame the concept of 
development as a set of basic needs outcomes, rather than as a process of transformative change 
in economic, social and political structures.”153 Despite these numerous observations, critiques, 
and warnings, the international community went ahead and replaced the MDGs with the SDGs, 
yet another goal-set.  
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Using nationally-derived plans, like the INDCs under the UNFCCC, would likely 
improve the success of international development. First, localized plans take into account the 
actual issues and capacity of the locality and are therefore more likely to lead to successful 
results. Second, States creating their own plans will likely cause changes in actual policy since 
the plans reflect the State’s interests; the external goals like the MDGs/SDGs result in 
governments just doing whatever the international community is willing to fund. While this 
proposal is not a perfect solution and does have some potential for abuse, requirements can be 
placed on the INDCs, the international community can review plans for adequacy, and the power 
to “name and shame” exists with just as much force as the current MDGs/SDGs. Though the 
international community has already accepted the SDGs as a goal-set for the next 15 years, the 
implementation of the SDGs and the creation of the post-2030 development agenda should pay 
close attention to the success of the INDCs.  
 
